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ABSTRACT 
One of the main reasons why smartphone users do not 
adopt screen locking mechanisms is due to the inefficiency 
of entering a PIN/pattern each time they use their phone. To 
address this problem we designed a context-sensitive screen 
locking application which asked participants to enter a 
PIN/pattern only when necessary, and evaluated its impact 
on efficiency and satisfaction. Both groups of participants, 
who prior to the study either locked or did not lock their 
phone, adopted our application and felt that unlocking their 
phone only when necessary was more efficient, did not 
annoy them and offered a reasonable level of security. 
Participants responded positively to the option of choosing 
when a PIN/pattern is required in different contexts. 
Therefore, we recommend that designers of smartphone 
locking mechanisms should consider ceding a reasonable 
level of control over security settings to users to increase 
adoption and convenience, while keeping smartphones 
reasonably secure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Current smartphone screen locking mechanisms are not as 
efficient as they could be because every time a user wishes 
to use their phone (e.g. make a call, open an app etc.) they 
need to enter a PIN, pattern or password. This additional 
step may be the reason why 64% of smartphone users do 
not lock their phones [4]. Of the users that do use a locking 
mechanism, 40-47% find it “annoying” [5,8,10]. This 
suggests that users who regard convenience to be important 
do not adopt locking mechanisms and those users who give 
high importance to security adopt locking mechanisms but 
still feel annoyed when using them. This leads to two 
usability problems:  efficiency and satisfaction.  
Attempts to improve smartphone authentication have 
typically considered alternative mechanisms, such as 
graphics [3], touch biometrics [12,20] and gestures [13,18], 
though such solutions have not adequately addressed 
efficiency and satisfaction [19]. To date context-dependent 
solutions [6,9]  have relied upon location sensors alone for 
determining when to require an explicit unlock with a 
locking mechanism. Using location alone, however, 
introduces insider attacks (attacks carried out by people 
who have unrestricted access to a victim’s space), which are 
increasingly becoming a major concern for users [5,16]. In 
our approach we augment location sensors with 
environment-related sensors (i.e., noise, light, magnetic 
field and accelerometer) to characterize the environmental 
surroundings of the smartphone. For example, only when 
the phone detects a change in environmental surroundings 
(e.g., different noise levels due to having friends over) 
would the phone ask for explicit unlocking. This adds an 
extra layer of security against insider attacks over location 
sensors only solutions. Thus, a context-dependent solution 
that uses location with environment sensors has two aims 
(1) to increase efficiency by reducing the instances in which 
users need to enter an explicit unlocking mechanism to only 
those in which the changes in the usage pattern and 
environment make it necessary to input a PIN/pattern, (2) to 
improve security for those users who currently do not lock 
their phone while maintaining a reasonable level of security 
for those users who currently lock their phone. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that this type of solution could increase use 
among traditional non-adopters (users who do not lock their 
phone), and reduce the level of annoyance to current 
adopters, whilst still providing an acceptable level of 
convenience and security.      
Thus, we designed and implemented a context-sensitive 
screen locking application and then evaluated its adoption 
using a 3-phase user study. We began by constructing an  
environment profile (Phase I) using 1 week of sensor data 
[11].  In the second week (Phase II) the application changes 
from passive data collection and analysis to an active screen 
locking mechanism which determines when to prompt the 
participants for a PIN/pattern depending upon the match of 
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the current sensor readings to the environment profile. In 
the third week of the study (Phase III) we evaluate the level 
of adoption of our application by giving the participants the 
choice of using our screen locking application or not using 
it at all and reverting to their previous screen locking 
mechanism (PIN/Pattern/No Lock) in five different contexts 
(“Home”, “Work”, “Other Places”, “On the move” and 
“New Places”). We are not aware of any other research 
which has tried to evaluate a screen locking mechanism by 
involving users in such an active and direct manner. Our 
objectives were:   
O1: To understand how users perceive our screen locking 
application in terms of annoyance, satisfaction and security.  
O2: To understand if prompting users with a PIN/pattern 
only when necessary will increase the adoption rate of our 
screen locking application. 
O3: To identify which kind of users (from those who 
currently do not lock their phone, and those who lock it) 
would adopt our screen locking application. 
O4: To understand the contexts in which users would adopt 
our screen locking application. 
In the following sections we describe the security threat 
model of this mechanism, provide an overview of the 
algorithm used in our screen locking application and 
explain the methodology used to fulfill our objectives. We 
then present our empirical, perception and adoption results 
and discuss how these results address our objectives.  
RELATED WORK 
There are two main areas of related work relevant to this 
research that we present in this section: context-sensitive 
screen locking solutions, and studies of user perception of 
smartphone locking mechanisms.  
Context-sensitive screen locking solutions 
Attempts to improve smartphone screen locking have 
typically considered alternative mechanisms, such as 
graphics [3], touch biometrics [12,20] and gestures[13,18], 
though such solutions have not adequately addressed the 
issues of efficiency and satisfaction [19]. Several recent 
solutions have focused on context-sensitive screen locking 
mechanisms. For instance, Gupta et al. [6] describe a 
context profiler which uses location traces to detect places 
of interest for a user, and they use the Bluetooth and Wi-Fi 
sensors to estimate a place’s familiarity. The calculated 
level of safety for a location is used to determine which 
kind of unlock mechanism is shown to the user, e.g. to 
request a PIN or not. Unfortunately, they do not involve 
users to confirm whether the familiarity of the place is 
correct. In our study, we confirm that our algorithms are 
correctly identifying locations by asking users to confirm 
the home and work locations. We use algorithms which 
aggregate related locations [14] to minimize user 
involvement and ask users to confirm home and work 
locations, only rather than confirming all five locations 
(home, work, other places, on the move and new places) to 
not overly annoy users.   
Hayashi et al. [9] use location data (e.g. Wi-Fi MAC 
address, IP address etc.) to modulate the level of 
authentication required. They provide the user with either a 
weak (none or PIN) or strong (PIN or password) unlocking 
mechanism based on location. With their framework they 
reduced explicit unlocks by 68%. They conducted two user 
studies. In the first they claim that they did not obtain 
positive usability results as they used a combination of PIN 
or password as the strong locking mechanism. In the second 
they used only the PIN as the strong locking mechanism, 
resulting in better usability results since users found the use 
of a password in the first study to be “too much of a 
burden” [9]. Riva et al. [17] used a variety of contextual 
factors to estimate the probability that the legitimate user is 
in close proximity to their device, from which they 
determined the mechanism to present in the unlock screen. 
Their study reduced the number of explicit unlocks by 42%. 
The main limitation of Riva et al.’s research is that it was 
not evaluated in the field.  
Our research builds on previous work in this area [6,9,17]  
in two ways: (1) we use environment-related sensors in 
conjunction with location-based sensors in order to add an 
extra layer of security over a location-only-sensor solution, 
(2) the user involvement in our field study, and particularly 
the third week of our study that evaluates the level of 
adoption of our mechanism (which no other research has 
evaluated in detail). Since one aim of our research is to 
increase the adoption of screen locking mechanisms, in the 
next section we present empirical research that investigated 
users’ perceptions of locking mechanisms. 
Locking perceptions 
Von Zezschwitz et al. compared the performance of 
Android-like patterns to PINs [21]. They found that for 
input speed and error rate, PINs performed better than 
patterns. But for ease-of-use, feedback and likeability, users 
preferred pattern locks. Despite these results, such explicit 
locking methods are still not considered efficient [10,22]. 
Van Bruggen et al. studied the use of “interventions” to 
improve  the adoption of smartphone locking methods 
among Android users [2]. They tried to tackle the “bring 
your own device” to work problem by evaluating several 
types of intervention messages (based on incentives, 
morality and deterrence) with the aim of convincing users 
to adopt a locking mechanism on their phone. However, 
they did not obtain a significant increase in the adoption of 
locking mechanisms, and they concluded that such 
interventions are not worth the cost. 
Harbach et al. [8] carried out an online survey of locking 
behaviors and risk perceptions, followed by a month-long 
experience sampling experiment in which participants were 
constantly asked to report on shoulder surfing while 
unlocking their phones. They found that participants who 
do not lock their phone were very satisfied with their choice 
and indicated very few situations where they would rather 
have locked their screen. For participants that did lock their 
devices, dissatisfaction was quite moderate in public 
situations, as participants valued protection slightly more in 
that context. They recommended that researchers should 
focus on decreasing the number of unlocks by deploying 
context dependent locking mechanisms. We took this 
recommendation into consideration for our study.  
Egelman et al. [5] study several threat models by comparing 
participants’ perceptions of the sensitivity level of the data 
stored on their smartphones. They found that 1/4 of 
participants locked their devices due to the possibility of 
insider attacks from friends and family (also highlighted by 
[16]). For this reason they recommend that the decision on 
whether the screen locking mechanism is shown or not 
should go beyond context and usage of the phone. This 
concern is addressed in two ways in our study, firstly our 
context-sensitive screen locking application determines 
when to show the PIN/pattern based on the characteristics 
of the environmental surroundings of the smartphone and 
secondly the users themselves select which contexts they 
want to be prompted for a PIN/pattern. The empirical 
research discussed in [2,5,8] provided the motivation 
required to evaluate the usability of our screen locking 
application. We describe the security threat model of our 
application in the next section. 
SECURITY THREAT MODEL 
Context-sensitive solutions which only use location sensors 
improve usability (over the use of an explicit locking 
mechanism) by reducing the number of explicit unlocks 
required, but this makes them vulnerable to insider attacks 
[5]. The aim of this work is to build a mechanism which 
increases the adoption of screen locking mechanisms, hence 
we had to cater for both users who lock and do not lock 
their phone. Thus, we could not only focus on improving 
usability but we also had to obtain a reasonable level of 
security. As reported upon in previous work [11,15] sensor-
driven authentication mechanisms are capable of detecting 
uninformed and informed security attacks in a reasonable 
amount of time and at the same time keep a low percentage 
of false positives. Hence, our main focus is on evaluating 
the usability of a mechanism that augments location sensors 
with environment sensor readings. Such a mechanism 
improves the usability for those users who lock their phone 
with an explicit mechanism by reducing the number of 
times that they have to enter a PIN/pattern, and maintains a 
reasonable level of security by asking for an explicit unlock 
only when the sensor readings do not match the 
environmental profile. In the case of those users who do not 
lock their phone this mechanism improves security by using 
a locking mechanism, which asks for an explicit unlock 
when the environmental sensor readings do not match the 
environmental profile. At the same time it keeps a 
reasonable level of usability since they are not asked to 
explicitly unlock their phone each time they need to use it. 
Although we are trying to handle insider attacks by 
augmenting location with environmental sensors we still 
consider these types of attacks to be challenging and we do 
not claim that our mechanism can catch all occurrences of 
these attacks. For this reason when there is a concern for 
such attacks, say at work, we gave the user the option (in 
Phase III) to adopt full PIN/pattern protection in those 
chosen contexts. Figure 1 illustrates how easy it is to select 
the locking mechanism for each context.    
 
Figure 1. Screen shots of application. 
ALGORITHM OVERVIEW  
In this section we outline the algorithm used to build our 
application. The algorithm combines five different sensors 
with the aim of characterizing many of the features that 
make up the surrounding environment of the smartphone. 
Every 1 min the application samples the following sensors: 
the accelerometer (x, y & z coordinates for 10 sec), Wi-Fi 
(access point names and IDs), light (light level for 5 sec), 
microphone (ambient noise levels for 10 sec) & 
magnetometer (x, y & z values for magnetic field for 10 
sec). These configurations are based on the individual 
sensor requirements tested in previously conducted pilot 
studies. These features are aggregated into one vector 
which consists of the following attributes for each feature 
(with the exception of Wi-Fi which is not numeric, and 
therefore we use the names and IDs): mean, mode, median, 
stdev, min, max and range. 
The decision to use these five sensors and a 1 min sampling 
rate is based on a trade-off between the level of security and 
battery consumption. To have an optimal level of security 
to identify short transitioning events (when users move 
from one room to another) we required a sampling rate of 1 
min or less (see Figure 2): in pilot tests that we carried out 
before this study we found that as we decreased the 
sampling frequency the attack detection time increased 
considerably. We considered a 30 sec sampling rate for a 
higher level of security, but due to battery consumption 
issues we would have had to use fewer sensors. In our pilot 
studies, we found that the battery of a Samsung Galaxy S4 
using a 1 min sampling rate and these five sensors (with the 
settings listed above) took 26 hrs to drain for normal phone 
usage (instead of 29 hrs without our application) and 10 hrs 
for high phone usage (instead of 10.4 hrs without our app) – 
see Figure 2. To avoid increasing the study participants’ 
burden we opted not to increase the sampling rate further. 
On the other hand, a less frequent sampling rate (e.g. 5 
mins) could have included more sensors (e.g. GPS, 
proximity) but this would have increased the attack 
opportunity.  
 
Figure 2. Time taken to drain phone per sampling rate 
for normal and high drain users. 
When building the profile (in Phase I), environment sensor 
data was sampled and J48 decision trees were established 
for each location. Before building the ambient profiles 
using J48 machine learning models the sensor data had to 
undergo two processing stages. In the first processing stage 
the raw sensor data was converted into sensor attributes 
(mean, mode, median, etc) as defined above. The second 
processing stage calculated a location anchor to attach to 
the sensor attributes created in the first stage. The location 
anchor was required because to define J48 machine learning 
models (ambient profiles) which learned the location from 
the provided sensor attributes, the sensor attributes had to 
be used as the input and the location anchors had to be used 
as the outputs of the machine learning algorithms. A 
specific module was implemented using Weka's Java 
component to create these ambient profiles locally (on the 
phone) on the early morning of the 8th day (the first day of 
Phase II). 
When later validating against the profile (in Phases II & III) 
at a particular location, current sensor readings were 
compared to the decision tree conditions in the profile for 
that location. For example, for location X, the profile 
expected a noise level less than 40dB and a light level 
greater than 100lux. If sensor readings were not within the 
set of conditions for that particular location or the current 
location was not recognized by the profile (”new places”), 
then PIN/pattern entry was requested. There can be multiple 
sensor configurations for each location (e.g. at home the 
decision tree contained a set of conditions for the morning 
and a completely different set for the night). 
We use the smartphone location to define different contexts 
for our study from which we confirmed actual location 
(ground truth) information from our participants. Thus, in 
Phase I of our study (see next section: Overall Approach) 
participants were asked to identify the Wi-Fi access point 
names that related to their home and work contexts. From 
these two contexts, we further defined the “on the move” 
contexts (continuously changing Wi-Fi access points) and 
the “other” contexts (a “catch all” for all other common 
locations, e.g. coffee shop or pub, which are not 
continuously changing and are not home or work). In 
Phases II and III we also use the "New places" context to 
define all those locations which were not visited when 
creating the profile during Phase I. 
USER STUDY 
In our user study we categorize two user groups; those who 
currently do not lock their phone, and those who lock it. In 
this way we can understand how our application would 
affect these two groups of users who have different security 
requirements. Hence, we asked participants to complete 
perception questionnaires with statements about annoyance, 
convenience and security to determine how they perceive 
our application in terms of these three properties throughout 
the three phases of the study (addressing O1). The user 
study included a third phase in which participants decide 
whether to adopt our screen locking mechanism or rollback 
to their previous mechanism based on context, to try to 
understand if prompting users with a lock screen only when 
necessary will increase the adoption rate (addressing O2). 
We also wanted to understand whether either of the two 
groups of users is more likely to adopt our application 
(addressing O3). This extra phase is also used to understand 
the contexts in which participants are more likely to adopt 
our application (addressing O4). Prior to our study we 
obtained ethical approval from our University’s Ethics 
Committee.  
Overall Approach 
To address our research objectives we conducted an 
exploratory user study consisting of three phases, and each 
phase took one week to complete (see Table 1). We 
constructed the profile with one week of data based on 
research conducted by Kayacik et al. [11], which found that 
in most cases a sensor-driven profile stabilizes after a week. 
During the installation participants chose their current 
smartphone screen locking mechanism, which they used 
during Phase I. We offered three options (no screen lock, 
PIN, and pattern) as these represent the most used screen 
locking mechanisms [4] and we recruited participants that 
used each of these mechanisms. For participants who chose 
either PIN or pattern, their “original” mechanism was also 
used for explicit screen locking in Phases II and III. For 
participants who indicated that they do not lock their phone, 
their “original” mechanism was “no lock”, and they were 
asked to select either a PIN or a pattern screen locking 
method to be used for explicit screen locking during Phases 
II and III. In Table 1 we provide an outline of all phases.  
Phase Steps involved Duration 
Setup 
 Study explained to participants. 
 Demographic questionnaire 
completed. 
 Installation of application. 
30 min 
Phase I: 
Data 
collection 
 Collected sensor data to create 
context-sensitive profile. 
 Participants used their original 
screen locking mechanism and 
evaluated its usability. 
1 week 
(20 min for 
usability 
feedback) 
Phase II: 
Evaluated 
our app 
 Participants evaluated the 
usability of our application. 
 Participants completed usability 
questionnaires at the end of each 
day. 
 Participants completed an end of 
phase questionnaire. 
1 week (20 min 
for usability 
feedback - end 
of each day 
+20 min for end 
of phase 
feedback)  
Phase III: 
Evaluated 
adoption 
of our app 
 Participants decided whether and 
in what contexts they wanted to 
adopt our app: home, work, other 
places, on the move, new places. 
 Participants evaluated the 
usability of our application in the 
adopted contexts. 
 On the 4th day participants were 
given the option to change setup 
and start/stop using our 
application in different contexts. 
 Participants completed an end of 
study questionnaire. 
1 week  
(20 min for 
usability 
feedback - end 
of each day 
+ 20 min at the 
end of study 
feedback) 
Table 1. Main procedure, steps and duration of study. 
We evaluated the usability of the original mechanism 
(Phase I), our screen locking application (Phase II) and the 
adoption of our application (Phase III)  by using the original 
System Usability Scale (SUS) [1] and a perception 
questionnaire adapted from [8].  In the questionnaire we 
asked for responses to the following four statements (at the 
end of Phase I and everyday during Phases II & III), with 
answers on a 5-point Likert scale (1-strongly disagree to 5-
strongly agree). 
S1: The number of times in which I had to unlock my 
phone today was annoying. 
S2: I felt secure with today’s phone protection mechanism. 
S3: Overall, the number of times in which I unlocked the 
phone today was convenient. 
S4: I wish there was a more convenient way of unlocking 
my phone. 
These questionnaires allowed us to evaluate the impact on 
usability of being prompted to unlock the phone with our 
screen locking application (Phase II) more/less than their 
original mechanism (Phase I). We used the end-of-study 
questionnaire to understand whether participants would use 
our screen locking application and how it ranked in the 
spectrum of current screen locking mechanisms in terms of 
annoyance, convenience and security.  We also collected 
logging data to compute the number of times in which 
participants unlocked their phone using the PIN/pattern and 
how long the participants took to unlock their phone.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited through social media and word 
of mouth. Participants that completed all three phases of the 
study were compensated with a £30 Amazon voucher. The 
compensation was directly related to the completion of the 
study and not whether participants adopted our application 
in Phase III. So as not to influence participants’ choice of 
locking mechanism, we only met with participants at the 
beginning and end of the study and we did not have any 
contact with them when they were transitioning from Phase 
II to Phase III, or when the application asked them whether 
they want to change their setup in the middle of Phase III. 
The pre-requisites to participate in this study were to own a 
fairly recent android phone (with hardware capabilities 
similar to a Samsung Galaxy S3), to have a regular 
home/work routine for the three weeks of the study and to 
have regularly used one of the following three smartphone 
screen locking mechanisms: no screen lock, PIN or pattern.  
Participants were divided into two groups by their use of an 
original screen locking mechanism: Group 1: “No Lock” - 
participants who use a swipe (default Android setting); 
Group 2: “Lock” - participants who use either a PIN or 
pattern. We grouped the PIN and pattern together as it was 
already challenging to recruit such participants since the 
vast majority of the population does not lock their phone 
(64% according to [4]). For this reason we also did not 
include password participants. Consumer reports [4] 
confirm that 23% of smartphone users use a 4-digit PIN and 
only 13% use a longer PIN, password or a pattern.   
Overall, we recruited 25 participants over 2.5 months, with 
20 completing the study. All participants completed the 
three phases of the study in the same order (see Table 1). 
Using the logging data we confirm that none of the 20 
participants uninstalled the application before the end of the 
study. Due to constraints placed by our university ethics 
committee we were required to uninstall the application 
from the participants’ phones after these three weeks. Of 
the five that did not complete, for two participants the data 
was not complete (i.e. phone was not collecting sensor data 
when in sleep mode), while the other three participants 
dropped out due to unexpected work/personal 
commitments. The participants of the study used a variety 
of phones: Samsung Galaxy S3 (7), Samsung Galaxy S4 
(7), Sony Xperia S1 compact (3), Samsung Galaxy Note 3 
(1) & LG Nexus 4 (2). The average participant age was 32 
(22-61), med=30. We opted to use the participants’ personal 
phones, rather than giving them a smartphone, as we 
wanted to encourage them to continue their normal 
behaviour throughout the study. 
RESULTS 
In this section we present the empirical, perception and 
adoption results collected across the three phases of the 
study in order to evaluate the usability and adoption of a 
context-sensitive screen locking application which 
augments location with environment-related sensors. Since 
the perception results were not normally distributed we 
analyzed them using Friedman’s test to understand the 
effect of using locking mechanisms across the study’s three 
phases. We used this test to also understand the difference 
in the perception of annoyance, convenience and security 
when compared to different locking methods. Wilcoxon 
pair-wise comparisons were used to determine which 
combinations were statistically significant. Note that in 
Phase III, two participants returned to their original 
mechanism and did not adopt our application (see Adoption 
Results for further details). Hence, in all Phase III results 
reported in the empirical results (Tables 2 & 3) and ratings 
of statements (Table 4) we exclude any ratings from these 2 
participants (N=18). When ranking locking mechanisms 
according to perceived annoyance, convenience and 
security we use the rankings of all 20 participants (N=20).  
Empirical Results 
Table 2 shows the average number of times (per day and 
according to context) in which participants entered a 
PIN/pattern to unlock their phone during the three phases of 
the study together with the average number of times that the 
participants activated their phone during a particular phase. 
Participants were always asked to unlock their phone with a 
PIN/pattern when they were in new places because if a 
place was not visited when the profile was created (Phase I) 
then it was not trusted. Our counts excluded those instances 
where the screen was “on” but locked such as when 
checking the time or checking for new notifications. In 
Phase II “Lock” participants unlocked their phone using a 
PIN/pattern an average of 16 out of 56 activations per day.  
Phase III results in Table 2 do not include any unlocks from 
the two participants that did not adopt our application, but it 
includes unlocks of those participants who adopted our 
application in at least 1 context.  The “No Lock” group 
experienced a drop in unlocks from 34% in Phase II to 24% 
in Phase III due to most participants in this group reverting 
back to using no lock when at home and at work (see 
Adoption Results for further details). 
Table 3 shows the average aggregate time taken (in sec) to 
enter PIN/pattern (per day) during the three phases of the 
study. Friedman statistical analysis of these results across 
the three phases did not highlight any significant 
differences. In the discussion section we compare these 
empirical results to the perception and adoption results to 
understand how they impacted the adoption results and 
perception of annoyance, convenience and security across 
the three phases. 
Group Context 
Phase I 
(N=20) 
Phase II 
(N=20) 
Phase III 
(N=18) 
“No Lock” Home 0 of 25 7 of 26 3 of 23 
 Work 0 of 15 6 of 21 3 of 18 
 Other Places 0 of 13 2 of 6 2 of 8 
 On the move 0 of 9 1 of 8 1 of 5 
 New Places 0 of 0 7 of 7 5 of 5 
 
Overall 
0 of 62 
(0%) 
23 of 68 
(34%) 
14 of 59 
(24%) 
“Lock” Home 19 of 19 6 of 23 4 of 19 
 Work 13 of 13 3 of 16 3 of 15 
 Other Places 9 of 9 2 of 8 2 of 6 
 On the move 4 of 4 1 of 5 1 of 4 
 New Places 0 of 0 4 of 4 2 of 2 
 
Overall 
45 of 45 
(100%) 
16 of 56 
(29%) 
12 of 46 
(26%) 
Table 2. Average number of times that the participants 
entered a PIN/pattern per day to unlock their phone. 
Group 
Phase I 
(N=20) 
Phase II 
(N=20) 
Phase III 
(N=18) 
“No Lock” 0 (0) σ =0 131 (103) σ =94 86 (55) σ =74 
“Lock” 240 (202) σ =260 105 (103) σ =99 90 (67) σ =81 
Table 3. Average time taken per day (sec) to enter 
PIN/pattern- mean, (median) & standard deviation (σ). 
User perception of the application  
We evaluated perception by analyzing the average of the 
daily results obtained in Phases II and III, as well as the 
results collected at the end of Phase I.  The target was to 
understand whether participants changed their opinion 
regarding the different mechanisms used across these three 
phases. In Table 4 we list the mean, median (in parentheses) 
and standard deviation (σ) results.  
Friedman statistical analysis of the results of statement S1 
(see Overall Approach Section) across the 3 phases did not 
highlight any significant differences. This might be related 
to the fact that the perception of annoyance of the “No 
Lock” group was relatively consistent across the three 
phases. This means that across the entire study the “No 
Lock” participants disagreed that the number of unlocks 
was “annoying”. On the other hand, “Lock” participants 
had a decline (not significant) in annoyance and standard 
deviation (see Table 4) when comparing the use of our 
application (in Phases II & III) to their original mechanism. 
Hence both groups disagreed that the number of times in 
which they had to unlock their phone was annoying.  
The results for S2 (see Table 4) show that the “No Lock” 
participants neither agree nor disagree about feeling secure 
with their original screen locking mechanism, while ”Lock” 
participants seem to agree that they feel secure with their 
original locking mechanism. Statistical analysis of the 
results of statement S2 across the three phases did not 
highlight any significant differences. This is related to the 
fact that the “Lock” group had a consistent feeling of 
security across all three phases of the study. On the other 
hand the perception of feeling secure for the “No Lock” 
group improved (not significant) and even had a reduction 
in standard deviation after using our application in Phases II 
& III. Thus there was a trend (albeit not significant) which 
showed that when using our screen locking application the 
"No Lock" group felt more secure.  
 Group 
Phase I 
(N=20) 
Phase II 
(N=20) 
Phase III 
(N=18) 
S1 
“No Lock” 
2 (2) 
σ =0.87  
2.62 (2.08) 
σ =0.90 
2.02 (2) 
σ =0.41 
“Lock” 
3.13 (3.5) 
σ =1.3 
1.89 (2) 
σ =0.60 
1.79 (2) 
σ =0.39 
S2 
“No Lock” 
3.22 (3) 
σ =0.83 
3.6 (4) 
σ =0.66 
4 (4) 
σ =0.5 
“Lock” 
3.63 (4) 
σ =0.71 
3.68 (4) 
σ =0.58 
3.86 (4) 
σ =0.12 
S3 
“No Lock” 
3.77 (4) 
σ =0.83 
3.26 (3.56) 
σ =0.81 
3.81 (4) 
σ =0.53 
“Lock” 
3 (3) 
σ =1.3 
4.02 (4) 
σ =0.26 
3.82 (4) 
σ =0.57 
S4 
“No Lock” 
3.44 (4) 
σ =1.01 
3.03 (3) 
σ =0.72 
2.83 (3) 
σ =0.83 
“Lock” 
3.50 (4) 
σ =1.02 
2.57 (2.21) 
σ =0.99 
2.68(2.64) 
σ =0.77 
Table 4. Average ratings for statements S1-S4 for each of the 
three phases. (1. Strongly disagree, 5. Strongly agree). 
The standard deviation results for S3 (see Table 4) show 
that there was quite a large spread (σ=1.3) in the 
convenience of the "Lock" participants that had to unlock 
their phone using their original mechanism (Phase I). 
Statistical analysis of the results of statement S3 across the 
three phases did not highlight any significant differences. 
Despite finding no significance, the results in Table 4 still 
show a trend (albeit not significant) that "Lock" participants 
found the number of times in which they had to unlock their 
phone using our application (in Phases II & III) to be more 
convenient than their original mechanism.  
Regarding S4 the results show that when they were using 
their original locking mechanism (Phase I) participants 
from both groups seemed to be either neutral or agree about 
whether there should be a more convenient way of 
unlocking their phone. Friedman statistical analysis of the 
results across the three phases found significant differences 
(X2 (2) =6.377, p = 0.041). Wilcoxon pair-wise 
comparisons across the results of the different phases 
(adjusted Bonferroni p value =0.017) returned significant 
differences when comparing the results from the original 
mechanism to the use of our application in Phase II (z=-
2,437, p=0.015) and in Phase III (z=-1.159, p=0.008). 
These results suggest that as participants from both groups 
used our application, their opinion shifted significantly 
from agreeing that they wished for a more convenient way 
of unlocking their phone to a more neutral/disagree stance. 
When we analyzed the "Lock" group results (for S1-S4) we 
did not find any significant differences between PIN and 
Pattern users.   
 Annoyance Convenience Security 
Password 1.84 (1) σ =1.21 4.47 (5) σ =0.90 2 (2) σ =0.94 
PIN 2.47 (2) σ =1.22 3.84 (4) σ =1.01 2.17 (2) σ =0.90 
Pattern 2.31 (2) σ =0.82 3.58 (4) σ =1.07 2.9 (3) σ =1.10 
No Lock 4.42 (5) σ =1.30 1.55 (1) σ =1.26 5 (5) σ =0 
Our App 3.95 (4) σ =0.91 2.42 (2) σ =1.07 2.79 (3) σ =1.40 
Table 5. Perception of annoyance (1=most annoying, 5=least 
annoying), convenience (1=most convenient, 5=least 
convenient) & security (1=most secure, 5=least secure) - mean, 
(median) & standard deviation (σ). 
At the end of Phase III we asked all 20 participants to rank 
the screen locking mechanisms used in this study (and 
Passwords) according to perceived annoyance, convenience 
and security. We asked participants to rank passwords as 
well because we believed that they had the appropriate 
experience of using passwords. Our motivation was to 
understand where participants would place our application 
in the spectrum of current screen locking mechanisms with 
respect to these three properties. Table 5 shows that with 
respect to annoyance, participants from both groups ranked 
our application to be the second least annoying out of the 
listed screen locking mechanisms, with only “no lock” being 
less annoying. Friedman statistical analysis across 
annoyance rankings of these five locking mechanisms 
found significant differences (X2 (4) =38.331, p < 0.001). 
Wilcoxon pair-wise comparisons across the results of the 
different locking mechanisms (adjusted Bonferroni p value 
= 0.005) showed significant differences when comparing 
the results from our application with “PIN” (z=-3.022, 
p=0.003), “Password” (z=-3.440, p= 0.001) and “Pattern” 
(z=-3.675, p<0.001). For “no lock” the difference with our 
application was not significant.  
Table 5 shows that with respect to convenience, participants 
from both groups ranked our application to be the second 
most convenient mechanism out of the listed current locking 
mechanisms, with only “no lock” being more convenient. 
Statistical analysis across convenience rankings of these 
five locking mechanisms found significant differences (X2 
(4) =40.080, p < 0.001). Pair-wise comparisons across the 
results of the different locking mechanisms showed 
significant differences when comparing the results of our 
application to the “PIN” (z=-2.917, p=0.004) and 
“Password” (z=-3.348, p=0.001). While in the case of the 
“no lock” and “pattern” locking mechanisms the differences 
were not significant.  
Table 5 shows that overall, with respect to security, 
participants ranked our application to be the third most secure 
mechanism when compared to the current locking 
mechanisms, with “no lock” and “pattern” being less secure.  
Statistical analysis across security rankings of these five 
locking mechanisms found significant differences (X2 (4) = 
48.012, p < 0.001). Pair-wise comparisons across the results 
of the different locking mechanisms showed significant 
differences when comparing the results of our application to 
the “no lock” (z=-3.769, p < 0.001). When compared to the 
“PIN”, “Password” and “Pattern” our application did not 
have a significant difference for security perception.   
We also asked participants to evaluate usability using the 
original SUS during all the three phases of the study (end of 
Phase I, daily for Phases II & III). Overall the participants’ 
original mechanism (Phase I) and our application (Phase II) 
received the same SUS Score: 74% (SD=±12.2516) and 
(SD=±6.3508) respectively. When adopted in Phase III our 
application received a SUS Score of 80% (SD=±7.6887) 
with a 90% confidence level of (90-93.54). There is no 
statistically significant difference between the overall SUS 
scores obtained across the three phases of the study, but 
these results suggest a SUS score for our approach no worse 
than current screen locking choices. 
Adoption results 
When moving from Phase II to Phase III, 18 out of 20 
participants chose to adopt our application in at least one of 
these five contexts: “home”, “work”, “other places”, “on 
the move” and “new places”. More than five “No Lock” 
participants adopted our application in the following three 
contexts: “other places”, “on the move” and “new places”. 
Also, all “Lock” participants adopted our application “at 
home”. The two participants that did not adopt our 
application were both in the “No Lock” group. The first 
participant explained his choice by saying that he is not 
ready to trade convenience with any kind of increase in 
security. The other participant explained his choice by 
saying that when he is at home or at work he does not feel 
that the people around him are a threat and when he is on 
the move, in other places or in new places he always keeps 
his phone in his pocket, therefore he does not need to use 
any smartphone locking mechanisms. Only two of the 
remaining 18 participants (both “No Lock” participants) 
changed the configuration in the middle of Phase III. One 
participant decided to stop using our application at work 
because he felt that he no longer needed security in this 
context but continued using it in other places, on the move 
and in new places. The other participant initially selected to 
use our application in other places, on the move and in new 
places but did not select it for home & work. But, after 
three days of not having any lock at work he realized that 
he actually wanted more security, so he also started using it 
at work.  
Group 
Over
all 
Home Work 
Other 
Places 
On the 
Move 
New 
Places 
“No 
Lock” 
8 1 4 7 5 8 
“Lock” 9 9 5 3 4 2 
Table 6. Final adoption results distributed by context. 
At the end of the study participants were asked whether 
they would use our application if it was commercially 
available and in which contexts they would adopt it. Overall 
17 participants said that they would adopt it (see “Overall” 
column in Table 6). This means that only one participant 
who opted to use our application in Phase III decided that 
he would not subsequently adopt it. This participant was in 
the “Lock” group and he explained his choice by saying 
that he is not ready to trade a higher level of convenience 
with a decreased level of security, therefore he prefers to 
have full security all the time. The 17 other participants said 
that they would keep the same setup that they selected in 
Phase III. 
DISCUSSION 
In this section we reflect on our research objectives by 
discussing the results outlined in the previous section.  
Is it secure, less annoying and convenient? (O1) 
The participants that originally did not lock their phone 
(“No Lock”) and those that locked their phone with either a 
PIN or pattern (“Lock”) felt secure when using our screen 
locking application in Phases II & III of the study. Inputting 
a PIN/pattern only when necessary made the “No Lock” 
group improve their security perception with respect to 
when they were not inputting any kind of lock. In the case 
of the “Lock” group the considerable decrease in number of 
unlocks that they experienced while using our application 
did not translate into a significant decrease in security 
perception, meaning that our application still made this 
group feel reasonably secure. These results were confirmed 
when we asked the participants to rank locking mechanisms 
according to security perception. When comparing the 
security perception of our application to the current locking 
mechanisms, the participants ranked our application 
significantly better than the no lock but relatively similar to 
the PIN and pattern (see Table 5). This is quite an important 
finding since in terms of security perception these results 
place our application on a par with industry standards such 
as the PIN and the pattern. This is just a user perception 
result and we are not claiming that our mechanism is more 
secure than current screen locking mechanisms.  
Despite introducing an average of 22 unlocks per day (see 
Table 2) and an average time spent entering a PIN/pattern 
of 131 seconds per day (see Table 3), the participants in the 
“No Lock” group still felt that our screen locking 
application was not annoying and they rated our application 
slightly higher than when they were not using a lock. 
“Lock” participants experienced a considerable but not 
significant decrease in annoyance when comparing their 
original mechanism to our application. This suggests that 
the decrease in time spent to enter a PIN/pattern from Phase 
I to Phase II (see Table 3) by an average of 135 seconds per 
day and the decrease in the number of times in which they 
needed to enter the PIN/pattern from 100% (45 of 45) to an 
average of 29% (16 of 56) per day (see Table 2) seems to 
have contributed to this shift in perceived annoyance. These 
results were confirmed when we asked the participants to 
rank locking mechanisms according to annoyance. When 
comparing the annoyance perception of our application to 
the current screen locking mechanisms, the participants 
ranked it to be on the same level as the no lock mechanism 
and significantly better than the PIN and pattern locking 
methods (see Table 5). Thus, in terms of annoyance 
perception these results place our application on a better 
level than current locking mechanisms. 
From a convenience perspective, although the “No Lock” 
participants experienced an increase in unlocks and time 
spent to enter a PIN/pattern they still felt that our screen 
locking application (in both Phases II & III) was convenient 
and rated the convenience level slightly less (not 
significant) than their original mechanism. Despite 
experiencing a sharp decrease in the number of times that 
they needed to unlock their phone and time spent to enter 
PIN/pattern (see Tables 2 and 3), participants in the “Lock” 
group did not experience a significant change in opinion 
when comparing the convenience of their original 
mechanism to our application (in both Phases II & III). 
Although, they still seemed to agree that the number of 
times that they unlocked the phone was convenient. This 
lack of a significant difference can be attributed to the fact 
that some of the participants still considered the PIN/pattern 
to be relatively convenient. However, when comparing the 
rankings of the perceived convenience of our application to 
the current screen locking mechanisms, participants ranked 
it similarly to the no lock and the pattern but significantly 
better than the PIN (see Table 5). Thus, in terms of 
convenience participants placed our application on a better 
level than the PIN and on the same level as the pattern.  
Is it adoptable? And by whom? (O2 & O3) 
18 out of 20 participants adopted our screen locking 
application in at least one context during Phase III and only 
one of these 18 participants said that he would not use our 
screen locking application if it was commercialized. This 
gives an overall adoption rate of 85% (17/20). This high 
adoption rate we believe can be explained by the results in 
Phase III (see Table 4) where both groups still ranked our 
application in a similar manner (sometimes even better) as 
they did in Phase II. This shows that participants of the 
study responded positively to the idea of choosing when a 
PIN/pattern is required in different contexts. The 
convenience results of S4 (see Table 4) also justify the high 
adoption rate because after only two weeks of using our 
application participants in both groups already exhibited a 
significant shift (from agree to quite close to disagree) in 
their opinion of whether they still required a more 
convenient way of unlocking their phone. The high 
adoption rate is also confirmed by the fact that the two 
groups of participants evaluated this mechanism similarly 
in all metrics (Table 4). There is no instance (for both 
Phases II & III) where one group evaluated our application 
significantly different from the other group. Similarly we 
found no instance where PIN and Pattern users evaluated 
our application significantly different from each other. 
This means that participants who currently do not lock their 
phone adopted our application because they felt that 
entering the PIN/pattern only when necessary was 
convenient, did not annoy them and offered them a 
consistent level of security. On the other hand, participants 
who lock their phone, adopted our application because it 
was more efficient (since it reduced the number of times 
they had to enter their PIN/pattern), less annoying, more 
convenient and they still felt secure. Hence, one of the 
major findings of our study is that both participant groups 
seem to indicate that a screen locking application which 
augments location with environment-related sensors has all 
the necessary qualities for being adopted.  
In which contexts would it be adopted? (O4)  
Our study confirmed Harbach et al.’s finding [8] that 
smartphone users were mostly dissatisfied with locking 
mechanisms when they were in private spaces. In fact, all 
“Lock” participants adopted our screen locking application 
at "home", since they had to explicitly unlock their phone 
during Phase II an average 6 times per day out of 23 
unlocks (see Table 2), thereby choosing the convenience of 
fewer PIN/pattern unlocks. In the questionnaires that we 
collected at the end of Phases II & III, participants stated 
that they did not consider "home" to be a major security 
threat. Despite “No Lock” participants having to explicitly 
unlock their phone during Phase II an average of 7 times 
per day out of 26 unlocks when at "home" and an average 
of 6 times per day out of 21 unlocks when at "work" (see 
Table 2), several “No Lock” participants preferred to use no 
lock at all in these contexts. In most cases the participants 
in this group (see Table 6) did not consider their home or 
work to be a threat therefore they did not want to enter any 
PIN/pattern when in these contexts. 
We can also report that most “No Lock” participants 
adopted our application in “other places”, “on the move” 
and "new places" because they felt that these are the 
contexts in which their phone is more likely to be exposed 
to a security threat. Most of the participants in the “Lock” 
group felt that the “other places” and “on the move” 
contexts were more likely to be exposed to a security threat. 
For this reason they selected the PIN/pattern in these 
contexts. This shows that in both groups there were 
common trends in the selection of contexts in which the 
participants decided to adopt our screen locking application. 
When linking these results to the results obtained in Phase 
III (see Tables 2-4) we can conclude that the one-size-fits-
all design currently being provided by manufacturers and 
recommended by security experts is one of the main 
reasons why smartphone users are not adopting current 
screen locking mechanisms. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The results obtained by this study are quite promising and 
the setup used was sufficient to address our objectives. 
However, due to the limitations of having a limited amount 
of participants (N=20) using one smartphone platform, 
future work should extend this study to a larger user-base 
and implement the application on additional smartphone 
platforms (IOS and windows phone) to provide further 
confirmation of our findings. In the larger study we plan to 
include users who use biometric screen locking 
mechanisms such as fingerprint and face recognition. While 
these are not currently widely used they may be at some 
stage in the future. Also, participants of this study were 
users with a regular daily routine. An interesting 
improvement would be to include users who do not have a 
regular daily routine so that we would evaluate how these 
kinds of users would perceive the use of our application. 
CONCLUSION 
Most smartphone users are not adopting screen locking 
mechanisms [4], while those who do adopt them find them 
annoying [5,8,10]. Through a user study we tried to tackle 
this problem by evaluating a context-sensitive screen 
locking application which used location and environment-
related sensors to ask participants to enter a PIN/pattern 
only when necessary, thus improving efficiency and hence 
usability. 
We found that 85% of all participants reported that they 
would adopt our screen locking application if it was 
available on their phone. This shows that asking users to 
unlock their phone only when necessary can increase the 
adoption rate of screen locking mechanisms. In terms of 
security perception, participants placed our application on a 
par with industry standards such as the PIN and the pattern. 
As regards to annoyance perception, participants thought 
that our application was better than the current locking 
mechanisms. With respect to convenience perception, 
participants placed our application on a better level than the 
PIN and on the same level as the pattern. Hence, 
participants perceived our application to be reasonably 
secure and at the same time it did not have the 
inconveniences of the existing screen locking mechanisms. 
We found that both groups of participants would adopt our 
application in a similar manner because there were no 
instances in which the results of the two groups were 
statistically different. Both groups of participants felt that 
unlocking the phone only when necessary was convenient, 
did not annoy them and made them feel secure. This means 
that despite having divergent security concerns both groups 
adopted our context-sensitive screen locking application. 
Hence demonstrating that the one-size-fits all design used at 
the moment does not meet the needs of smartphones users. 
Therefore, we recommend that designers of smartphone 
authentication methods should consider ceding a reasonable 
level of control over security settings to users to increase 
adoption and convenience of authentication. Ultimately this 
would make smartphones and the sensitive data stored on 
them more secure since it would increase the use of security 
mechanisms among traditional non-adopters. 
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